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Figure 2. Pearl culture.
(A) Schematic of the internal anatomy of the pearl oyster. The region from which donor tis-
sue (saibo) is extracted is indicated by the red dotted line. (B) A marble-shaped nucleus and 
small piece of saibo are implanted into the host oyster. (C) Host oyster after harvest of first 
pearl and insertion of second nucleus. (D–G) Schematic of pearl sac development. On day 1, 
nucleus and saibo are inserted into the pearl pocket (D). After approximately 6–12 days, the 
incision has healed and epithelial cells from the saibo have migrated around the nucleus to 
form the pearl sac. Organic material has been deposited onto the nucleus, followed by an ir-
regular prismatic layer (E). On days 15–20, the prismatic layer now has a regular appearance 
(F). After approximately 30 days, the pearl sac has a homogeneous appearance and no trace 
of the saibo graft remains. The nacreous layer of the pearl has begun to form (G). (am: ad-
ductor muscle; ct: connective tissue; m: mantle; nl: nacreous layer; nu: nucleus; ol: organic 
layer; pl: prismatic layer; pp: pearl pocket; ps: pearl sac; sa: saibo; sn: nacreous layer of shell; 
sp: prismatic layer of shell.)increase in the amount of genetic 
data available for pearl molluscs, 
including the sequencing of the 
Pinctada fucata genome last year. 
Transcriptome sequencing of both 
the mantle and pearl sacs and 
proteomics of shells and pearls 
has shown that the same genes 
and proteins are involved in their 
synthesis — to date, no unique ‘pearl’ 
genes have been found. There are, 
however, indications that genes 
that are highly expressed in the 
nacreous region of the mantle are 
not necessarily also highly expressed 
in the pearl sac, and that pearl 
formation may be more complex than 
originally supposed.
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Ian J. Deary
Some people are cleverer than others. 
I think it would be a good thing if more 
biologists began with that observation 
as the starting point for their research. 
Why? Because it is a prominent 
and consistent way in which people 
differ from each other; because the 
measurements we make of people’s 
cleverness produce scores that are 
correlated with important life outcomes; 
because it is interesting to discover 
the mechanisms that produce these 
individual differences; and because 
understanding these mechanisms 
might help to ameliorate those states 
in which cognitive function is low or 
declining.
Psychologists study intelligence 
in two different ways. First, cognitive 
psychologists mostly focus on 
trying to find out how the normal 
mind works. They try to enumerate 
the mental functions that we share. 
They try to discover how those 
functions fit into a mental system. 
Second, differential psychologists 
mostly focus on how people differ 
in the workings of their minds. 
They try to enumerate the major 
domains of function in which 
people differ. They try to discover 
the causes and consequences of 
these differences. The two types of 
psychologist studying intelligence 
don’t communicate very well. For 
example, if you look at texts on 
cognitive psychology, you will find few 
mentions of individual differences. 
This primer is about the differential 
psychology of intelligence.
Most academics who do not work in 
intelligence differences are skeptical 
when the field is mentioned. This 
might be for a number of reasons. 
First, the word ‘intelligence’ can 
appear to be too general; surely, it is 
argued, that there are so many distinct 
cognitive capabilities that we are all 
good at some mental skills. Second, 
there are some events in the history 
of intelligence research that have 
appeared to discredit the field; some 
people will recall divisive 11-plus 
tests of the old UK school system, 
or have heard about the Cyril Burt 
affair (there is debate about whether 
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Figure 1. The hierarchical model of intelligence variance.
At level 1 people differ in specific tests that assess the various cognitive domains. Scores on 
all the tests correlate positively. It is found that there are especially strong correlations among 
the tests of the same domain, so a latent trait at the domain level can be extracted to repre-
sent this common variance. It is then found that people who do well in one domain also tend 
to do well in the other domains, so a general cognitive latent trait called g can be extracted. 
This model allows researchers to partition cognitive performance variance into these different 
levels. They can then explore the causes and consequences of variance at different levels of 
cognitive specificity-generality. For example, there are genetic and ageing effects on g and on 
some specific domains, such as memory and speed of processing. Note that the specific-test-
level variance contains variation in the performance of skills that are specific to the individual 
test and also contains error variance.he was fraudulent or careless with 
his twins’ data on intelligence), or be 
aware of the over-application of IQ 
tests at Ellis island, or have read about 
controversies concerning studies 
of intelligence differences between 
ethnic groups, or think that the IQ-
type test has been replaced with the 
idea of ‘multiple’ intelligences, and 
so on. Third, it is possible that clever 
people develop a kind of cognitive 
noblesse oblige; they kind of know 
they have won the lottery on a valuable 
trait, but they think it is bad form to 
acknowledge it. Fourth, it is possible 
that they have not been exposed to the
research which has accumulated on the
topic; if they have the opportunity to 
study the research, they can make up 
their own mind.
Intelligence as phenotype
“Define intelligence,” is the common 
skeptical imperative. The researcher 
Linda Gottfredson’s definition 
of intelligence is often repeated: 
“Intelligence is a very general mental 
capability that, among other things, 
involves the ability to reason, plan, 
solve problems, think abstractly, 
comprehend complex ideas, learn 
quickly and learn from experience. It 
is not merely book learning, a narrow 
academic skill, or test-taking smarts. 
Rather, it reflects a broader and deeper 
capability for comprehending our  
 
surroundings — ‘catching on,’ ‘making 
sense’ of things, or ‘figuring out’ what 
to do.”
I prefer to begin the consideration 
of the intelligence phenotype from an 
empirical regularity that was discovered 
in 1904 by the British psychologist 
Charles Spearman. He found that 
people who perform well on one type of 
cognitive test tend to perform well on 
others. That is, if cognitive test scores 
are ordered so that better performance 
equals a higher score, the correlations 
between them are all positive. There 
is shared variation among all types 
of cognitive performance. Spearman 
called this shared/common variance g: 
an abbreviation for general intelligence. 
In the 100+ years since then, every 
study that has applied a diverse battery 
of cognitive tests to a decent-sized 
group of people with a mix of ability 
levels has re-discovered the same 
thing: there is some cognitive variance 
shared by all cognitive tests. Typically, 
if one applies principal components 
analysis, just under half of the total test 
score variance is accounted for by the 
first unrotated principal component. 
This applies: whether the tests are 
paper-and-pencil-based, or one-to-one 
tests; whether the content is verbal, 
numerical, or spatial; or whether the 
functions being tested are to do with 
reasoning, memory, speed of thinking, 
vocabulary, or even simpler tasks like reaction time, and so on. Therefore, 
from a cognitive test battery, people 
can be given a score to represent 
their relative g levels. These are not 
idiosyncratic to the particular tests they 
were given; as long as a decent-sized 
battery of tests is given, any group of 
tests will produce a g score that will 
rank people almost identically.
Therefore, part of the reason why 
some people do better on any one 
mental test is because they have a 
higher g level. The parameter g is not 
the whole story, however; there is some 
variance in cognitive performance 
that is not explained by g. Intelligence 
researchers have reached a consensus 
that there are three levels of variance in 
cognitive performance (Figure 1). So, if 
we ask why, for example, 100 people 
obtain different scores in a test that 
requires them to find the next number 
in a series of numbers, the answers are 
that: some of them are generally better 
at all cognitive tests, some are better at 
reasoning tasks as a whole, and some 
are better at a narrow skill that is specific 
to numerical reasoning tasks. Of course, 
we should not omit that there is error and 
idiosyncratic variance; some of them just 
felt better on the day.
There is an industry of cognitive 
test development. Some tests are 
devised for researchers, and some 
for applications in child development, 
education, occupational selection, 
and health and dementia. Tests 
range hugely in forms and contents: 
some are self-completed, and some 
require one-to-one examination. 
There is growing on-line testing. 
Alongside the tests, the statistical 
field of psychometrics has grown in 
parallel, with statistical procedures 
such as factor analysis, item response 
theory, and structural equation 
modeling. These are concerned with 
the reliability and validity of cognitive 
tests. IQ-type test scores are highly 
reliable, and validity is dealt with 
later. The test scores are also highly 
stable. For example, when the same 
intelligence test is taken at age 11 
years and repeated at almost 80, 
about half of the variance is stable.
Causes of intelligence differences
Genetics and environment
Twin and adoption studies provide 
evidence that differences in intelligence 
are heritable. The percentage of the 
variation in intelligence accounted 
for by genetic causes is usually given 
at about 50%. Heritability estimates 
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whereas estimates for adults are 
higher (up to 70–80%). There might 
be some small decline in heritability 
in old age, but it remains high. Some 
studies that include many diverse tests 
of mental abilities have computed the 
heritabilities of g and the more specific 
domains of intelligence. They find that 
g is highly heritable and that there is 
less genetic influence that is specific to 
each domain. There is some evidence, 
though mixed, that the heritability of 
intelligence is higher among more 
affluent people when compared with 
more deprived individuals.
Within the range of normal cognitive 
abilities — that is, apart from studies 
of learning difficulties — the molecular 
genetic study of intelligence is still 
quite new. There have been almost 
no well-replicated associations 
between candidate genetic variants 
and intelligence. An exception is the 
APOE gene: people with one or two e4 
alleles of this gene tend to have lower 
cognitive ability in old age, and tend 
to decline more in cognition across 
their lifetimes, than those who lack 
e4. Genome-wide association studies 
(GWAS) of intelligence have not yet 
revealed any additional variants with 
genome-wide significance.
There is, though, molecular genetic 
evidence that some variance in 
intelligence differences is detected 
by common single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs). The application 
of the genetic complex trait analysis 
(GCTA) method to intelligence 
differences in childhood and older age 
found that between a quarter and a half 
of the variance could be accounted for 
by variants in linkage disequilibrium 
with common SNPs. GCTA creates 
a genetic relationship matrix among 
unrelated individuals and calculates 
the association between this genetic 
similarity and phenotypic similarity. 
This analysis did not identify the causal 
variants; it suggested that intelligence 
is highly polygenic, with large numbers 
of variants of small effect sizes. 
Bivariate GCTA analysis has shown 
that the genetic correlation between 
intelligence measured in childhood and 
old age in the same individual is high; 
to a substantial extent, the same genes 
cause higher intelligence in childhood 
and older age.
Current research is accumulating 
larger sample sizes for larger GWAS 
of intelligence; for the complex traits 
of height and obesity, for example, increasing the sample sizes has 
brought substantially more genome-
wide significant hits, and these are 
accounting for ever-higher proportions 
of the phenotypic variance. Also being 
pursued are strategies whereby the 
GWAS of phenotypes linked with 
intelligence are being used to create, 
in separate samples, polygenic risk 
scores for the phenotype. These 
polygenic risk scores are then tested 
for association with intelligence. For 
example, using GWAS data from the 
Psychiatric GWAS Consortium, a 
polygenic risk score was created for 
schizophrenia in separate samples of 
older people with intelligence data, 
none of whom had suffered from 
schizophrenia. Those with higher 
polygenic risk for schizophrenia 
tended to have lower cognitive ability 
in old age and also had larger relative 
declines in cognitive ability between 
childhood and old age. Further studies 
will extend such analyses to other 
phenotypes with which intelligence is 
associated, to establish the extent of 
their genetic correlations.
With regard to the environment, twin 
studies suggest that the contribution 
of shared environment to intelligence 
differences is small, even negligible, by 
adulthood, and that that which is non-
genetic is largely due to non-shared 
environment and measurement error.
Brain correlates of intelligence 
differences
Beyond the general finding that 
there is some genetic variation in 
intelligence, there is a modest (~0.30) 
correlation between intelligence 
test scores and overall brain size. 
As yet, it is not understood what 
it is about bigger brains that is 
associated with being brighter. 
There is a similar-sized correlation 
between general intelligence and the 
general integrity of the brain’s white 
matter, as measured using diffusion 
tensor magnetic resonance brain 
imaging. This correlation is largely 
accounted for by people’s differences 
in speed of processing. There is 
some support from brain imaging and 
electroencephalographic research that 
cleverer brains are more efficient.
Consequences of intelligence 
differences
A reason to take intelligence differences 
seriously is that scores on intelligence 
tests are associated with a number of 
important life outcomes.Education
People who score better on intelligence 
tests tend to stay longer in education, 
to gain higher-level qualifications, and 
to perform better on assessments 
of academic achievement. Some of 
the correlations between intelligence 
scores at the end of primary school 
and academic results some years 
later are high, suggesting that it is not 
just a matter of education boosting 
intelligence. Also, educational 
attainment has a moderately high 
heritability, and a strong genetic 
correlation with intelligence. On the 
other hand, there is also evidence 
that education can provide a boost to 
scores on tests of complex thinking, 
and some of these increments last into 
old age. Therefore, there is probably 
a bidirectional causal association 
between intelligence and education.
Social status and social mobility
People who score better on intelligence 
tests tend to go into more professional 
occupations (typically those with 
higher status) and to perform better 
in the workplace. There is a positive 
association between intelligence test 
scores in childhood and social position 
later in life: people who score higher 
tend to be in more professional jobs, 
to live in less deprived areas, and to 
have higher incomes. The association 
is not perfect. Results show that, when 
it comes to attained social position 
in maturity, intelligence, education 
and parental background all count to 
some extent. That is, there is some 
meritocracy and intelligence-driven 
social mobility, and there is also some 
social inertia. There is some evidence 
for a so-called gravitational hypothesis: 
that intelligence in youth relates more 
strongly to occupational and social 
position later rather than earlier in 
adulthood.
Health, illness, and death
People who score better on intelligence 
tests tend to make healthier lifestyle 
and dietary choices, to have better 
health, to be less likely to have chronic 
illnesses like cardiovascular disease, 
and to live longer. These findings have 
been the result of the field of cognitive 
epidemiology, which is little more than 
a decade old. Some of the studies in 
this field have been heroic in size and 
duration: some are of sample sizes of 
over 1,000,000 people, and some have 
intelligence test data in childhood and 
then data on health information up to 
Current Biology Vol 23 No 16
R676more than 60 years later. Just focusing 
on the intelligence–death associations, 
this applies to mortality from all causes, 
to cardiovascular deaths, to suicides 
and homicides, and to accidental 
deaths, but probably not to deaths 
from cancer. The associations between 
intelligence in youth and health and 
survival into old age are not explained 
by parental social class. There is some 
statistical mediation of the association 
by education and the person’s own 
social class in mid-life, though it is not 
clear whether this is informative about 
the mechanistic pathways involved or 
whether education and occupational 
social class are, in part, acting as 
proxies for intelligence. 
Currently, there are four possible 
accounts of the intelligence versus 
health/death associations: that they 
are associated because, even in youth, 
intelligence is capable of indexing 
some general, underlying bodily system 
integrity; that the intelligence test 
scores detected some pathology even 
in youth; that intelligence is associated 
with later health choices and lifestyles; 
and that intelligence acts as a selection 
variable into safer occupational and 
social environments. These are being 
tested at present.
The ageing of intelligence
Intelligence has an important place 
in the world’s changing demographic 
structure. Especially in so-called 
developed countries, populations 
have a growing proportion of older 
people, greater absolute numbers of 
them, and people are living longer. 
As well as bodily changes with age, 
cognitive capabilities decline too. 
There are declines in cognitive function 
even among people who do not 
develop dementia. Not all cognitive 
functions decline at the same rate. 
Some cognitive functions — often 
referred to as markers of crystallized 
intelligence — hold up well with age. 
These include vocabulary and general 
and specific knowledge. The cognitive 
functions that tend to decline are 
called fluid intelligence. These tend 
to involve on-the-spot thinking with 
novel materials, and in situations in 
which past knowledge is of limited 
help. This includes abstract reasoning, 
spatial abilities, processing speed, and 
working and other types of memory. 
The empirical data show that, when the 
various fluid-type cognitive functions 
are studied, we find the hierarchy 
again. That is, age has a negative effect on the variance shared by all tests, and 
also some specific effects in addition 
to that, principally on the domains of 
processing speed and memory.
Not everyone experiences the same 
rate of cognitive decline, and there is 
a growing interest in the genetic and 
environmental (biological and social) 
determinants of people’s differences 
in age-related cognitive changes. Not 
many of these determinants are well 
replicated. Some of the more solid 
evidence exists for the following being 
cognitively protective: not having the 
APOE e4 allele, being physically more 
active and fit, and not smoking.
For biologists, apart from helping 
psychologists to seek more 
determinants of healthy cognitive 
ageing, there are two theoretical ideas 
that might be attractive in the study 
of the ageing of intelligence. The first 
is the idea that some people have 
cognitive reserve such that their brains 
are better able to withstand the insults 
of age and illness. Researchers in this 
area write about the possibility of there 
being passive brain reserve and active 
reserve. Passive reserve refers to the 
possibility of there being some aspects 
of brain structure — maybe even as 
prosaic as just  having a bigger brain — 
that provides the reserve. Active 
reserve refers to the possibility that, in 
response to an insult, some people’s 
brains are more flexible in reorganizing 
networks to regain or retain cognitive 
functions. The other idea in research 
on the ageing of intelligence is the 
common cause hypothesis. This is built 
upon some empirical findings which 
suggest that the age-related decline of 
different bodily systems is correlated; 
that is, people who are experiencing 
faster cognitive declines might also be 
experiencing faster declines in sensory 
and some physical functions. In so 
far as this occurs, researchers have 
sought possible common causes that 
might provide the mechanisms or at 
least indicators of them. They have, 
for example, considered inflammation, 
oxidative stress, telomere length, and 
the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis.
Other issues in intelligence research
There are still findings and 
controversies about sex and race 
differences in research. With respect to 
the former, the better data come from 
massive samples of children tested 
in school settings, where there has 
been either full-population testing or 
the testing of representative samples. These tend to show that boys and girls 
have about the same mean level of 
intelligence. They also show that, for g, 
the boys have greater variance: there 
is an excess of boys at the lower and 
upper ends of the intelligence scale.
There continues to be discussion 
about the so-named Flynn effect, 
whereby the absolute scores on 
intelligence tests have been rising 
since testing started in the early-to-mid 
20th century. The extent of the rise, its 
geographical distribution in the world, 
and especially its causes are all still 
being studied. Some hypothesise that 
better nutrition might explain some of 
the increase, and others put it down 
to society’s making more accessible 
and emphasizing the skills tested by 
intelligence tests.
There is interest in finding 
interventions that might boost 
intelligence. On the biological side there 
is research showing that breast feeding 
is associated with a sizeable advantage 
in intelligence later in childhood. 
However, there is also some evidence 
that this is explained by the higher 
intelligence scores of the mothers 
who tend to breastfeed. There is still 
unresolved researching and discussion 
of the possible social boosters of 
intelligence. For example, adoption 
from a deprived to a more affluent 
setting is reported to be associated 
with an intelligence advantage. There 
is still debate about the effectiveness 
of intensive intervention programmes 
early in life, and whether any cognitive 
advantages last or whether advantage 
accrues to social rather than cognitive 
skills. 
Human intelligence is important; it 
matters in our lives. Understanding the 
biology of intelligence differences could 
help to ameliorate declines in cognitive 
function.
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